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ARTICLE 
RESTRAIN "RISKY BUSINESS": TREAT HIGH-
RISK PRIV A TE SECURITY CONTRACTORS 
AS INHERENTL Y GOVERNMENTAL 
CHARLES TIEFER * 
Should Congress limit private security contractors ("PSCs") in wartime by 
declaring that high-risk activities are "inherently governmental"? In govern-
ment contracting law, private contractors are not permitted to conduct activities 
deemed inherently governmental. As a result, only governmental actors may per-
form those functions. The role of PSCs in war zones raises a number of ques-
tions as to where the line exists, in determining what is, or is not, within this 
classification. Traditionally, the government draws the line at combat and com-
bat-related activities-only these functions are inherently governmental. This 
Article argues that the line should instead be drawn at "high-risk" activities, 
which would include a number of functions outside of combat. The author bases 
much of his argument on his personal experiences and observations as a mem-
ber of the Commission on Wartime Contracting. 
Should Congress limit private security contractors ("PSCs") in wartime 
by declaring that high-risk activity is "inherently governmental"? There is 
little guidance from statutory sources, which define "inherently governmen-
tal," merely as "so intimately related to the public interest as to require 
performance by federal government employees.'" In the private security 
context, "inherently governmental" has come to mean only those activities 
that are very closely related to combat.2 
The wars of the past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan included major 
incidents and appalling discoveries about PSCs. The tremendous rise of 
PSCs in the United States' war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan fits with a 
broader trend toward privatization3 of military efforts.4 These wars dramati-
* Commissioner, Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan; Professor, 
University of Baltimore Law School. This Article represents the views of its author alone and 
not those of the Commission or any part thereof. The author is grateful for the research assis-
tance of Jen Machlin, Ian Gore, Elisabeth Connell, Megan Burnett, Katherine Furlong, and 
Alison Schurick, and also the assistance of Bijal A. Shah, Bob Pool and the rest of the school's 
library staff. 
'31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2006) (quoting Section 5(2)(a) from Pub. L. 105-270, 112 Stat. 
2382 (1998), as amended by Pub. L. 108-271, § 8(b), 118 Stat. 814 (2004); Pub. L. 109-115, 
§ 840, 119 Stat. 2505 (2005)). 
2 Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,227 
(Sept. 12, 2011). 
3 For the background of outsourcing and privatizing, see generally Symposium, Public 
Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1211 (2003); Gillian E. Metzger, Priva-
tization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003) (giving contemporary examples of 
privatization and its implications for current constitutional doctrine). 
4 For discussions of the development of a contractor role in privatized military support, 
see generally PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILI-
TARY INDUSTRY (2003); Deven R. Desai, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: A Proposal for a 
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cally increased the importance of restraining what PSCs do, within the gen-
eral issue of the limits of privatization.5 
The two dominant regulatory models prohibit PSCs from engaging in 
either combat-related or high-risk related activities. The current preference is 
to bar PSCs only from combat-related functions, like accompanying troops 
into battle. In contrast, this Article proposes that the limit instead concern 
what is "high-risk." The two models clash as to the lessons drawn from the 
killing of dozens of Iraqi civilians in Baghdad at Nisour Square in 2007.6 
Members of the Blackwater Worldwide ("Blackwater") private security firm 
were escorting a convoy of State Department personnel through Baghdad. At 
Nisour Square, the Blackwater guards, some of whom claim they faced a 
threat, opened fire on civilians, killing seventeen Iraqis. Public attention con-
tinued as federal prosecutors charged the guards, and the case immediately 
devolved into procedural wrangling.7 
As one commentator put it, "the fallout from the September 16 shoot-
ing by Blackwater guards in Baghdad was as publicly damaging to U.S. 
efforts in Iraq as was the My Lai massacre in Vietnam."8 Moreover, media 
coverage resembled that of previous incidents in Iraq involving private con-
tractors9 such as scandalous interrogation techniques at Abu Ghraib. lO 
Layered Approach to Regulating Private Military Companies, 39 V.S.P. L. REv. 825 (2005); 
Virginia Newell & Benedict Sheehy, Corporate Militaries and States: Actors, Interactions, 
and Reactions, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 67 (2006) (exploring the interaction between private military 
firms and traditional state entities); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punish-
ment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REv. 879 (2004); Kristen 
Fricchione, Note, Casualties in Evolving Warfare: Impact of Private Military Firms' Prolifera-
tion on the International Community, 23 WIS. INT'L LJ. 731 (2005) (discussing the legal and 
jurisdictional ramifications of the increased reliance on private forces); Ellen L. Frye, Note, 
Private Military Firms in the New World Order: How Redefining "Mercenary" Can Tame the 
"Dogs of War," 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2607 (2005) (proposing a more exact definition of 
"mercenary" as means of controlling unwanted non-military behavior). 
5 See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.V. L. REv. 
543 (2000); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 
CAL. L. REv. 569 (2001); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 MIL. L. REv. 
1367 (2003). 
6 See generally David H. Chen, Note, Holding "Hired Guns" Accountable: The Legal 
Status of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, 32 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 101 (2009). 
7 See Josh Meyer, Blackwater Killings Called Unprovoked; Unsealed Papers Reveal Pros-
ecutors' Claims that Guards Targeted Iraqis in "Shocking Attack," Hous. CHRON., Dec. 9, 
2008, at AI. 
8 ROGER D. CARSTENS, MICHAEL A. COHEN & MARIA FIGUEROA Kupcu, CHANGING THE 
CULTURE OF PENTAGON CONTRACTING 9 (2008) (quoting from New America Foundation dis-
cussion group). 
9 See, e.g., Mark W. Bina, Private Military Contractor Liability and Accountability After 
Abu Ghraib, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1237 (2005) (discussing current federal laws, interna-
tionallaws, and cases relevant to the Abu Ghraib scandal); Scott J. Borrowman, Sosa v. Alva-
rez-Machain and Abu Ghraib-Civil Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts by U.S. 
Military Personnel and Civilian Contractors, 2005 B.Y.V. L. REv. 371; Steven L. Schooner, 
Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Out-
sourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL'y REv. 549 (2005) (describing the allegations that 
contractor personnel were involved in the Abu Ghraib abuses, and raising concerns with regard 
to the outsourcing trend in the military). See generally Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: 
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The Nisour Square incident illustrates the difference in the models: no 
enemy was present in the street, so the PSCs were not engaged in anything 
like combat, just guarding. On the other hand, that kind of PSC work may 
well have been "high risk," suggesting that PSC presence was improper. I I 
Generally speaking, three particular problems are present in the war zone: 
(1) safety risks to local nationals that may occur in mobile protecting or 
convoying; (2) risks of PSC payoffs to the enemy; and, (3) lack of accounta-
bility where PSCs are subcontractors or sub-subcontractors. 
How should the United States address this problem? The current gov-
ernment rules and policy put an inadequate limit on what the government 
classifies as inherently governmental, because the government rules merely 
preclude activity closely linked to combat. I2 
Unfortunately, the Department of Defense ("DoD") and the State De-
partment ("State") have twice ducked the need to address the failing of the 
combat-related model. In 2007, they increased regulation without drawing a 
strong line to limit the functions of PSCs. In 2009, the Obama Administra-
tion made efforts to clarify the limits of PSC activity, 13 but by 2011 had not 
meaningfully changed the regulatory criteria. 
Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan shows that the government should 
have a stronger limit on PSC activities, precluding "high-risk" functions 
regardless of whether combat occurs. Many believe the government has in-
centives, powerful but far from admirable, to use PSCs up to the limit al-
lowed. As one commentator puts it, "[c]ontractor[s'] ... presence dilutes 
body counts (as contractor fatalities are not officially tallied or publicly an-
nounced) .... Their presence also allows the government to avoid politi-
cally difficult policy decisions regarding whether to withdraw .... "14 This is 
not just the story of President Bush in Iraq; it is also the story of President 
Obama in Afghanistan. 15 
Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1751 (2005) (discussing how 
to deter atrocities, including those by privatized military companies). 
10 See generally Matey Strauss, The Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269 (2005) 
(referring to the Bush administration's disregatd of international legal norms, including the 
Geneva Conventions). 
11 The attack in Benghazi, Libya, in late 2012, which resulted in the killing of a U.S. 
Ambassador and three other Americans, represents another high-risk, but non-combative situa-
tion, in which PSCs were employed. The U.S. State Department chose to employ Blue Moun-
tain Group, a "virtually unknown" PSC, rather than the latge firms it usually employs. Blue 
Mountain in tum hired local Libyans, including some with no prior security training. Tabassum 
Zakaria et ai., For Benghazi Diplomatic Security, U.S. Relied on Small British Firm, REUTERS 
(Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2012/101l8/us-libya-usa-bluemountain-idUS 
BRE89GlTI20121018. 
12 Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 75 Fed. Reg. 56227 
(Sept. 12, 2011). 
13 Government Contract, 74 Fed. Reg. 9755-57 (Mat. 6, 2009). 
14 Jon D. Michaels, Privatization'sPretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 717, 722 (2010) (foot-
notes omitted). 
15 See generally Walter Pincus, Contracts May Hold Pointers on Afghan Policy, WASH. 
POST, May 10, 2011, at A15 (describing how "[p]rivate security contractors working for the 
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Legislation in 2007 established the Commission on Wartime Con-
tracting in Iraq and Afghanistan ("Commission"). 16 The Commission's char-
ter included a provision requiring that the Commission look into whether 
wartime contractors, like Blackwater, performed inherently governmental 
functions. From 2008-2011 the Commission studied the PSC issue. It con-
ducted two dozen televised hearings, including several devoted to PSCS,17 
and made trips to Iraq and Afghanistan to look at contracting in the warzone 
itself. Notably, the Commission drew attention in its final report to an im-
portant but little-known problem: that PSCs in Afghanistan divert funding to 
the Taliban. 18 This amounts to a major funding source for the enemy l9 and 
also provides funding for problematic warlords.20 
Part I of this Article discusses the need for a stronger limit on PSCs, 
based on the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, interest in 
better defining inherently governmental activities started with the use of 
PSCs during the period of active combat by United States Armed Forces, 
and continues to the present day, after military drawdown, in which the State 
Department is using PSCs extensively in place of military support. The Af-
ghanistan experience, involving diversion of funds by the PSCs to the 
Taliban and the potential for corruption in the Karzai regime is not widely 
known and warrants attention. Another problem is the attenuated govern-
mental control when, as is common, PSC firms are not prime contractors, 
but instead are sub- or sub-subcontractors. 
Defense Department in Afghanistan actually increased by almost 4,500 in the first quarter this 
year over last year and totaled almost 19,000 altogether"). 
16 Further information on the Commission may be found on its website, http://www.war 
timecontracting.gov. The Commission has held a number of televised hearings and issued sev-
eral reports. 
17 See Jessica Coomes, Debate Over Private Security Contractors, Inherently Governmen-
tal Functions Continues, 93 FED. CONT. REp. (BNA) No. 197 (June 22, 2010). 
18 Juliette Kayyem, Editorial, How the US Funds the Taliban, Bos. GLOBE, Sept. 19,2011, 
at 13. 
19 COMM'N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, TRANSFORMING WARTIME CONTRACTING: CON-
TROLLING COSTS, REDUCING RISKS 73 (2011) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. The author 
of this Article, as a Commissioner, was deeply involved in this issue. The author's role on the 
Commission grew from his prior studies as a professor of government contracting law. See 
generally CHARLES TIEFER & WILLIAM A. SHOOK, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW IN THE 
TWENTy-FIRST CENTURY (2012) (providing a broad case study of court findings on govern-
ment contracts); see also Charles Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement-
Aided Unilateralism as a Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. I (2007) [hereinafter 
Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle] (tracing the significance of contracting); Charles Tiefer, Can Appro-
priation Riders Speed Our Exit From Iraq?, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 291 (2006) (expressing the 
potential impact of so-called "riders" on the war). 
Also, the author drew on other investigative work as counsel for the congressional investiga-
tion of Iran-Contra. As Special Deputy Chief Counsel on the House Iran-Contra Committee, 
the author co-wrote the chapter in the committee report on the Boland Amendments. See S. 
REP. No. 100-216 & H. REp. No. 100-433, at 395 (1987). For a previous discussion drawing 
on that service, see George W. Van Cleve & Charles Tiefer, Navigating the Shoals of "Use" 
Immunity and Secret International Enterprises in Major Congressional Investigations: Les-
SOliS of the Iran-Contra Affair, 55 Mo. L. REv. 43 (1990). 
20 Kayyem, supra note 18. 
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Part II discusses how Congress might establish and implement a limit 
as to high-risk uses and the ensuing benefits. The best examples of "high-
risk" uses are Personal Security Details ("PSDs") or convoy security for 
mobile work in (1) an area of enemy strength and activity or (2) other areas 
where PSCs may make payoffs to the enemy.21 
I. FAILINGS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN OF THE U.S. POLICY THAT DOES 
NOT TREAT HIGH-RISK USE OF PSCs As "INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL" 
A. The Start-the Private Armies of State and HalliburtonlKBR22 
Debate over the propriety of privatized security is longstanding and 
global.23 One recent commentator, tracing the origins of the debate to past 
centuries, concluded that though PSC use had begun "as early as the 
1970s," the PSC role had "grown exponentially since September 11, 2001 
and with the outbreak of protracted Western military engagements in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq."24 Another commentator found that "demand for this 
type of firm [i.e., PSCs] exploded with operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. "25 
This expansion took a new form starting in 2003, with the start of the 
Iraq War. This conflict saw "the corporatization of military service provid-
ers that sets them apart" from their predecessors.26 In other words, the gov-
ernment now turned over to major private firms the handling of warzone 
operations on an unprecedented scale. Among other aspects, the federal gov-
ernment privatized some of its own security needs to PSCs. The government 
also outsourced some of the logistical and construction support for its mili-
tary, and private companies engaged in such work outsourced their own 
large security needs to PSCS.27 
In Iraq, starting in 2003, DoD and State created an expansive new role 
for PSC firms. Of the estimated 180,000 contractor employees serving in 
Iraq at the peak of U.S. military operations in the mid-2000s, up to 30,000 
were armed security contractors, "who carry guns and perform quasi-mili-
21 See Hamida Ghafour, Afghans Are Fed Up With Security Firm: Residents of a Kabul 
Neighborhood Say They Feel They Are Under Occupation as DynCorp Barricades a Street and 
Conducts Searches, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at A3. 
22 Initially Halliburton was the name of the logistics contractor in the war zone. Then 
Halliburton spun off its subsidiary, KBR, which thereafter was the logistics contractor. 
"KBR" is the acronym for the company that is also called Kellogg, Brown and Root. 
23 See generally DEBORAH AVANT, THE MARKET FOR FORCE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
PRIVATIZING SECURITY (2005); SINGER, supra note 4; Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle, supra note 19. 
24 Daphne Richemond-Barak, Rethinking Private Waifare, 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 
159, 165 (2011). 
25 E.L. Gaston, Note, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modem Private Security Industry 
and its Implications for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT'L. LJ. 
221, 226 (2008). 
26 SINGER, supra note 4, at 45. 
27 SINGER, supra note 4, at 45. 
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tary roles."28 Moreover, because DoD intended to hold down the number of 
troops in Iraq, the Army decided not to provide soldiers for duty as security 
for State. Thus, State had to satisfy its needs for personal security details by 
turning to PSCS.29 The problems that ensued, such as the Nisour Square inci-
dent, originated with the DoD decision not to provide military protection. 
The head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer, made a 
hasty, unconsidered contract with Blackwater to provide his PSD.30 State 
followed suit. It thereby took upon itself the potential problems of giving 
broad functions to PSCs, which often alienate local civilians. State could 
have taken a truly governmental approach over the longer term by, for exam-
ple, expanding the Diplomatic Security Bureau, which provides protection 
for State around the world. State could have created a Bureau reserve force 
that could activate for wartime situations and could shift to standby in peace-
time. PSCs could have filled the gap in the short run while State established 
its reserve force. However, it did not take any such in-sourcing approach. It 
did not bring the long-term need to Congress and ask for a long-term solu-
tion that would minimize problems of alienating civilians in Iraq and other 
war zones. 
This myopic decision necessitated the broad freedom of activity given 
to firms like Blackwater. The New York Times stated in a 2010 front-page 
story that "documents sketch, in vivid detail, a critical change in the way 
America wages war: the early days of the Iraq war, with all its Wild West 
chaos, ushered in the era of the private contractor, wearing no uniform but 
fighting and dying ... and killing presumed insurgents."31 
When State turned to PSCs, it passed an invisible line. Traditionally, the 
government hires private security guards, but these were just static guards to 
protect civilian or DoD facilities. Such static guarding does not involve 
high-risk functions and does not raise the possibility of harm to local nation-
als or of payoffs to the enemy. There are exceptions, of course-guarding of 
troop camps in areas of Taliban strength and activity may sometimes be on 
the front line-but the vast majority of static guard tasks are not high risk. 
The loose limits on PSC activities also set the stage for another large-
scale use of PSCs, distinct from personal security details: convoy duty. 
When convoys of supply vehicles drive through areas where the enemy 
28 Jonathan Finer, Recent Development, Holstering the Hired Guns: New Accountability 
Measures for Private Security Contractors, 33 YALE J. INTL L. 259, 260 (2008). 
29 Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Hired Guns: While the Volunteer Anny Struggles, the Business 
of War Booms, AM. CONSERVATIVE, Nov. 19,2007 ("As the war grew more dangerous, so did 
the need for armed contractors. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority until 
it turned over the keys to the Iraqis in 2004, introduced the first private security detail into 
Iraq, hiring Blackwater to the tune of $21.3 million. In an astonishing display of firepower, 
Bremer was routinely surrounded by thirty-six civilian guards and 'a fleet of SUVs, two bomb-
sniffing canine teams with handlers, four pilots, four aerial gunners, a ground crew and three 
Boeing MD-530 'Little Bird' helicopters,' Pelton reports."). 
30 Gaston, supra note 25, at 228. 
31 James Glanz & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaks Reveal Chaos of War: u.s. Reliance on 
Private Contractors in Iraq Resulted in Numerous Pitfalls, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,2010, at AI. 
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might ambush them, the convoys need security. HalliburtonIKBR, a logistics 
contractor, had the largest number of convoys in Iraq, for work such as de-
livering food and other supplies to bases and camps. The standard clause in 
its logistics contract required it to ask the relevant military commanders 
about Army protection, and not use PSCs without consulting the military.32 
However, HalliburtonlKBR apparently did not obey the clause, as al-
leged in a case brought by the United States. Eventually, in 2010 the Justice 
Department filed a False Claims Act case against KBR, contending that 
KBR had concealed the scheme by massive billing for claims for PSC work 
that it knew to be false. 33 Halliburton is alleged to have made wholesale use 
of PSCs for convoy duty without the necessary consultation with the mili-
tary. Its government contract allowed it to obtain reimbursement of costs, 
plus profit, for its work on the contract, and it allegedly buried the improper 
PSC bills in its complex subcontracting. This is a sign of yet another of the 
structural and inherent difficulties of keeping PSCs from posing high risks, 
namely remoteness or "tiering" -that the government hires prime contrac-
tors (first tier), and the prime contractors hire PSC subcontractors (second 
tier). Sub- (or sub-sub-) subcontractors are even more remote from govern-
mental oversight, to prevent carrying out high-risk functions, than directly-
hired PSCs would be. 
The Defense Contract Audit Agency ("DCAA")34 in 2008-2009 gave 
briefings to the Commission on Wartime Contracting about its discovery of 
some aspects of the scheme.35 Plainly KBR, like Bremer and State, found 
high-risk use of PSCs sufficiently advantageous to take their use further.36 It 
is extraordinary to envision an entire army of KBR's subcontracted convoy 
PSCs as they ride shotgun throughout Iraq, subject neither to governmental 
oversight nor legal liability. 
Halliburton's subcontracting practices first surfaced in a dramatic inci-
dent in 2004 that demonstrated the dangers of using PSCs for high-risk func-
tions. In Fallujah, insurgents attacked a convoy, killed four Blackwater 
guards, and mutilated the bodiesY Congressional staff found that "Blackwa-
ter USA triggered a major battle in the Iraq war in 2004 by sending an 
32 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Sues Kellogg, Brown and Root for Alleged 
False Claims Act Violations Over Improper Costs for Private Security in Iraq (Apr. 1, 2010) 
[hereinafter U.S. Sues Kellogg], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201O/ApriI/1O-
civ-359.html. 
33 Walter Pincus, Government Sues Defense Firm KBR, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2010, at All. 
34 DCAA provides audit and accounting services to DoD regarding contracts. 
35 E.g., LOGCAP: Support Contracting Challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan: Hearing 
Before the Comm'n on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Ajg., Illth Congo (2009) (statement 
of April G. Stevenson, Dir., Def. Contract Audit Agency), available at http://www.wartime 
contracting.gov/index.php/hearings/46-commission/67-hearing20090504. 
36 See Pincus, supra note 33, at All; U.S. Sues Kellogg, supra note 32. 
37 Jack Kelly, Firms Become Targets in Iraq: High-Risk Jobs Get Even Riskier, PITTS-
BURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 18,2004, at AIS. 
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unprepared team of guards into an insurgent stronghold, a move that led to 
their horrific deaths and a violent response by V.S. Forces .... "38 
In response, V nited States troops went into the center of the insurgency, 
the start of a bloody "Battle of Fallujah." This battle of revenge over PSCS39 
exacerbated the division between Iraqi Sunnis and the V.S. military, materi-
ally escalating the intensity of hostility and determination on both sides to 
wage war. This showed one of the ways that the use of mobile PSCs for 
convoy duty in areas in which the enemy has a substantial, active presence, 
like Fallujah, presents high risks, including the risk of escalating violence. 
Moreover, the government did not fully understand the root cause of the 
incident until the much later lawsuit over KBR exposed the large-scale im-
proper hiring of lower-tier convoy PSCs. 
After a series of other problematic PSC incidents came the Nisour 
Square shooting in 2007.40 In a congested intersection in Baghdad, one vehi-
cle in a Blackwater convoy of four vehicles became convinced, probably 
mistakenly, that it was threatened. It is alleged that each of the four vehicles 
opened fire with machine guns on the street filled with civilians, leaving 
seventeen Iraqis dead and more than twenty wounded.41 
In the immediate aftermath of Nisour Square, the government depart-
ments, particularly State, implemented damage control measures, channeling 
criticism of PSCs toward minor regulatory changes rather than strong limits 
on PSC use. By then, State had spent years using PSCs for its own conve-
nience.42 State employees working to coordinate with the Iraqis, or training 
of the Iraqi police, did not have to beg for troops to be spared for PSDs, 
because they were willing to serve at State's convenience-for pay. 
Moreover, PSCs such as Blackwater hired ex-soldiers, often from elite 
special forces units, without having to beg from DoD on the other depart-
ment's timetable. KBRlHalliburton, too, benefitted from the easy availability 
38 Dems: Blackwater Provoked Fallujah Battle, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 28, 2007, at 12. 
39 "To avenge the deaths [of the contractors] and find the perpetrators, U.S. Marines 
began an assault on the city [of Fallujah]." BRADLEY GRAHAM, By HIS OWN RULES: THE 
AMBITIONS, SUCCESSES, AND ULTIMATE FAILURES OF DONALD RUMSFELD 459 (2009). 
40 See, e.g., STEVE FAINARU, BIG Boy RULES: AMERICA'S MERCENARIES FiGHTING IN IRAQ 
(2008) (describing problematic PSC incidents). 
41 There are countless journalistic accounts of this incident. The one by the Iraqi govern-
ment has significance, both because of its factual findings and as an indication of the Iraqi 
governmental reaction. See, e.g., Sudarsan Raghavan, Iraqi Probe Faults Blackwater Guards; 
17 People Killed Without Provocation At Baghdlld Square, Officials Conclude, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 8, 2007, at A12. 
42 For a general treatment of Rumsfeld's relations with State concerning Iraq, see generally 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, HARD LESSONS: THE IRAQ RECON· 
STRUCTION EXPERIENCE (2008). As to State's use of PSCs to its own convenience, Commission 
staff briefings were provided to the author in connection with State's testimony in the June 21, 
2010 hearing before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. See 
generally Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Where Are We Going?: Hearing Before the 
Comm'n on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Ajg., Illth Congo (2010), available at http:// 
www. wartimecontracting.gov/index.phplhearings/commission/hearing20 1 0-06-21. 
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of PSCs who would drive convoys on a schedule for the company's conve-
nience without, apparently, having to consult with the military. 
So, after Nisour Square, PSC use remained problematic because it was 
in State's self-interest to continue the hiring and use of PSCs in high-risk 
situations. State was neither willing nor able to substitute for PSCs either 
military troops or its own government protection personnel. Hence, State 
chose not to strengthen limits on uses of PSCs. State executed a Memoran-
dum of Agreement with DoD that clarified the role of military commanders 
over PSCs in their area.43 The contemporaneous congressional Defense Au-
thorization ActM formalized what State and DoD had agreed. Without State's 
damage control measures, Congress might have gone further and put in 
place stronger limits on what high-risk functions PSCs should not perform.45 
An internal State Department inquiry, headed by a senior State official, 
produced a report ("Kennedy Report")46 with eighteen specific reforms,47 
some (but not all) of which were soon implemented. State boasted that it 
implemented the Kennedy Report and that incident report numbers fell. 48 
The department had made some reforms, albeit fewer than it maintained.49 
State had to decide whether to renew Blackwater's contract at the end of 
its five year duration. Despite Nisour Square, as the press reported, "[i]n 
April [2008], the State Department renewed its contract with Blackwater, 
which is the largest security contractor in Iraq with 1,000 employees."5o 
43 Michael J. Navarre, Departments of State and Defense Sign MOA on Private Security 
Contractors, 43 PRocuREMENT L. 3, 3 (2008). 
44 10 U.S.C.S. § 2302 note (LexisNexis 200S). 
45 One may speculate about why Congress did not put in place stronger limits on PSCs. 
Congressional reformers had limited legislative resources. They could not overcome, on all 
PSC issues, the combined resistance of the Bush Administration and the State Department. So, 
the reformers concentrated on the successful creation of the Commission on Wartime Con-
tracting, which had the jurisdiction to pursue further the PSC issue, and other wartime con-
tracting issues as well. 
46 See generally ERIC J. BOSWELL ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE'S PANEL ON 
PERS. PROTECTIVE SERVS. IN IRAQ (2007), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/94122.pdf. For a recent comment providing context, see Laura A. Dickinson, 
Outsourcing Covert Activities, 5 J. NATl. SEC. L. & POLICY 521 (2012). 
47 Daniel Dombey, Rice Orders Crackdown on Iraq Contractors, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24, 
2007, http://www.ft.comlintllcms/s/0/f03eIOfO-SI bb-II dc-9b6f-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2BM 
9uW85t. 
48 See generally U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-OS-966, REBUILDING IRAQ: 
DOD AND STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE IMPROVED OVERSIGHT AND COORDINATION OF PRIVATE 
SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ, BUT FURTHER ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO SUSTAIN IMPROVE-
MENTS (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/assetsI2S01279161.pdf. State argued that it had 
completed "more than half' of the Panel's recommendations, and the GAO concluded that 
"The State Department has implemented II of the IS recommendations made by the Panel." 
Id. 
49 State and 000 set up bodies to coordinate PSCs in the field, to supervise their compli-
ance with rules, and to review their self-reported serious incident reports. Moreover, the gov-
ernment stepped up matters like training, vetting, and firearms control. 
50 Andrea Stone, Iraqis to Take Charge of Green Zone in '09, USA TODAY, Dec. 30, 200S, 
at A7. 
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State further expressed the position that "it would await the results of 
an ongoing FBI investigation into the [Nisour Square] shooting in 2007 
before possibly reconsidering."51 So, State let Blackwater continue to have 
the privileges of a top private contractor being non-governmental (like pay-
ing high salaries and accruing high profits) while performing what were ar-
guably governmental functions. The investigation and prosecution of the 
guards was drawn out over several years due to arcane procedural issuesY 
Back in Iraq, during those years when State had never seriously consid-
ered using the opportunity to quickly terminate Blackwater, negotiations be-
tween State and the Iraqi government over a Status of Forces Agreement 
("SOFA") bogged down for the entire year of 2008. The SOFA was essen-
tial to an orderly drawdown of United States armed forces. The opportunity 
for a gradual and smooth transition to a good relationship on this issue with 
a fully independent Iraq was jeopardized by this delay.53 One of the main 
demands of the Iraqis, which continued unresolved to the very end of the 
negotiations, consisted of their desire for control over PSCs in order to ter-
minate Blackwater and end the absolute immunity for PSCs from 
sanctions. 54 
At the end of 2008, after the United States presidential election, State 
threw in the towel and concluded a SOFA with the Iraqis ceding control over 
PSCs. As was reported at the time,55 "[t]he State Department does not plan 
to renew a contract with Blackwater .... the Iraqi government ... seemed 
to have forced the State Department's hand."56 
In the following years, the United States began drawing down its 
troops, and since the drawdown commenced, the Iraqi government-the 
Maliki regime-has been cracking down on the highly unpopular PSCsY 
State tried initially to plan a very large-scale role for PSCs in Iraq to fill 
some of the vacuum left by the troop drawdown.58 Among other initiatives, 
State made an effort, very unpopular with the Iraqis, to keep a large contin-
511d. 
52 See United States v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In April 2011, the D.C. 
Circuit remanded the case back to the district court for consideration under a different stan-
dard. The district court had dismissed the charges. Id. These delays on the order of four or 
more years were not even on an issue 'of the substantive conduct by PSCs that had been 
charged, but a collateral issue of the way statements after the incident had been taken and used. 
53 See generally Stone, supra note 50. 
54 See id. 
55 Monte Morin, Iraq Rescinds License for Security Firm, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at 
A4. 
56 State Dept. Does Not Plan to Renew Blackwater Security Services Contract, 91 FED. 
CONT. REp. (BNA) No. 89 (Feb. 10, 2009). 
57 Michael S. Schmidt & Eric Schmitt, Flexing Muscle, Baghdad Detains U.S. Contrac-
tors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,2012, at AI. 
58 "The [State Djepartment plans to hire 5,500 private security contractors, roughly 
double the current number," and, "[alII this could cost between $25 billion and $30 billion 
over the next five years .... " Mark Landler, Report Lists Perils for Envoys After U.S. Exit 
from Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,2011, at A5. 
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gent of PSCS.59 Besides PSCs directly employed by the United States, this 
plan included PSCs on the logistics convoys under KBR.60 
The Iraqi government resisted such a large PSC role. At the start of 
2012 it took many steps against PSCs. The press reported that "[p]rivate 
contractors . . . remain a powerful symbol of American might, with some 
Iraqis accusing them of running roughshod over the country."61 
B. Afghanistan: PSCs Diverting U.S. Funds to the Enemy 
In the absence of a single attention-grabbing horrific event like Nisour 
Square, PSCs in the Afghanistan War generally did not get major public 
notice in the early years. Casual observers missed the distinctive high risks 
of PSCs in Afghanistan. Some aspects of the Afghanistan War warrant con-
sideration nevertheless. Afghanistan was involved in war throughout much 
of the country at least back to the arrival of the Soviets in 1978. Afghanistan 
has no recent tradition of a strong central government that would make 
Kabul a reigning capital over much of the country, like Baghdad in Iraq. 
Instead, ethnic, tribal, and warlord loyalties reign supreme, particularly over 
the Afghans likely to take up arms, whether for loyalties, for a living as 
hired PSCs, or alternating from one to the other. 
Accordingly, there is much less reason than in Iraq to bring in many 
non-Afghans for most PSC work.62 One 2011 Washington Post article 
claimed that "[p]rivate security contractors working for the Defense De-
partment in Afghanistan actually increased by almost 4,500 in the first quar-
ter this year over last year and totaled almost 19,000 altogether .... Only 
136 of the added security contractors were American; 322 were third-coun-
try nationals; and the remainder were Afghans."63 
Also, the United States sent fewer troops into Afghanistan prior to the 
two surges initiated by the Obama Administration, early in 2009 and in 
2010-2011. The smaller number of military and civilian personnel before 
the surges meant less need for PSDs and less need for convoying PSCs. As a 
result the PSC problem did not become stark until later. 
The distinctive problems with PSCs in Afghanistan burst into public 
attention with a report by a subcommittee of the House of Representatives 
59 "The Iraqi public is not happy with private security contractors. They caused a lot of 
pain." Schmidt & Schmitt, supra note 57. 
60 "Food convoys from Kuwait are guarded by private security contractors under an inher-
ited military contract." Karen DeYoung, U.S. Evaluating Size of Baghdad Embassy, Officials 
Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2012, at A13. 
61 Schmidt & Schmitt, supra note 57. 
62 As the Commission reported, "[tlhe u.s. military employs 4,373 private security con-
tractors ... with 4000 of them Afghans." David Zucchino, Afghans Growing Wary of U.S. 
Security Contractors, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, at AI. 
63 Walter Pincus, Contracts May Hold Pointers on Afghan Policy, WASH. POST, May 10, 
20\ 1, at A15. 
220 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 50 
entitled "Warlord, Inc."64 That report explained that PSCs diverted funds to 
those warlords who have power over highways and over development 
projects.65 The United States government contractors hire security subcon-
tractors.66 These subcontractors, in tum, payoff potentially hostile groups by 
diverting some of that contractor funding.67 
It is the standard operating procedure in Afghanistan for PSCs to nego-
tiate with those figures-warlords or Taliban-with armed power over an 
area, rather than fight and die for some remote central regime in Kabul tied 
to foreign entities from far away.68 Sometimes in Afghanistan the individuals 
employed by a local PSC switch back and forth between working for United 
States subcontractors, and working for Afghan warlords.69 
Diversion to the Taliban and to warlords is a distinctive part of a larger 
problem with reliance on Afghan PSCs. The New York Times reported at the 
end of 2011 that PSCs "have long been a source of tension in the country. 
Some Afghan companies operated as private militias for warlords and many, 
along with some American companies, have been plagued by accusations of 
corruption, illegal use of weapons and reckless use of force resulting in civil-
ian deaths and injuries."7o 
In spring 2011, a mission by the Commission on Wartime Contracting 
to Kabul and Kandahar shed light on the PSC situation.71 Also, the press 
reported that a special Army task force had made similar findingsJ2 The 
American government had become alert to the PSC problem, as the Ameri-
can commitment doubled and as the scattered indications formed a clearer 
pattern.73 Specifically the government recognized that the problem went be-
yond simply diverting American contracting funds to payoff the warlords. 
Warlords take regional governing power away from Kabul and in this way 
64 See generally MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WARLORD, INc.: EXTORTION AND CORRUPTION ALONG THE U.S. SUPPLY 
CHAIN IN AFGHANISTAN (2010) [hereinafter WARLORD, INC.]. 
65 [d. at 17-2S. 
66 [d. at 1. 
67 [d. at 34-39. 
68 See generally id. at 29-33. 
69 Gaston, supra note 25, at 239. 
70 Ray Rivera, Obstacles Hinder Formation of Afghan Security Force, Report Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2011, at A4. 
71 The author was on that trip and attended briefings by offices or task forces in charge of 
Afghan corruption, Afghan threat financing, and the Host Nation Trucking Program. The re-
sults of that trip were conveyed to the public in the Commission's final report later in 2011. 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, at 73-74. 
72 Deb Riechmann & Richard Lardner, Corruption Toll on Afghan Contracts Put at 
$360m: Task Force Says US Funds Lost to Taliban, ASSOCIATED PREss (Aug. IS, 2011), http:// 
articles.boston.coml20 II-OS-IS/newsI29901515_1_task-force-insurgents-afghanistan. 
73 Two surges in 2009 and 2010-2011 had doubled the troop commitment from 50,000 to 
100,000, with a corresponding increase of use of PSCs for supply convoys and the like. Addi-
tionally, the government's information came from different places and from different sources, 
so that it took time and effort to understand the problem as a whole, and to accept the unwel-
come realization of how big the problem was. 
2013] Restrain "Risky Business" 221 
weaken the central government, but at least warlords (usually) do not wage 
open war against Kabul. 
Rather, the new insight is how payoffs-not episodically, but in a 
large-scale way-go to the Taliban for the roads and areas where the Taliban 
has the power.74 The United States is funding the enemy.75 It is thought that 
diversion of American contracting funding constitutes the second largest 
source of funding for the Taliban, second only to the Taliban take from the 
immensely lucrative opium poppy trade.76 
One example of how funding to the Taliban occurs is where an Afghan 
PSC77 for a convoy, pausing at a road barrier, will sit and talk with the head 
of a Taliban fighting unit who had set up the barrier. Afghan PSCs and the 
Taliban will negotiate the size of a payoff, with the naturalness of paying a 
high local "tax" to the "local government" for passage through some una-
voidable, locally-controlled stretch of road. 78 In some instances the convoy 
PSCs might make a payoff in cash; or, they might turn over some readily 
salable cargo of a convoy, such as fuel trucks. Without payoffs, a convoy 
faces a substantial risk of becoming a battle casualty. 
Here is a journalistic account of one such sequence: 
After a pair of bloody confrontations with Afghan civilians, two of 
the biggest private security companies ... were banned from es-
corting NATO convoys .... [T]hat day, a NATO supply convoy 
rolling through the area came under attack .... Within two weeks, 
with more than 1,000 trucks sitting stalled on the highway, the 
Afghan government granted [the PSC firms] permission to 
resume.79 
No example comes to mind in American history when United States funds 
furnished this large a share of support for the enemy in a war.so 
It appears that there is little American knowledge of what happens with 
the PSCs of any particular convoy between their starting point and their 
74 "Diversion on this scale did not occur in Iraq, where the U.S. military provided most of 
the escorts for similar convoys." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, at 74. 
75 See Riechmann & Lardner, supra note 72, at 1. 
76 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, at 74. 
77 "As for private security contractors there were 20,735 in Afghanistan-the vast major-
ity of them locals." U.S. Paid Contractors in Iraq Expected to Total 14,000 by End of FY-I2, 
INSIDEDEFENSE.COM (Jan. 30, 2012), http://defensenewsstand.comlindex.php?option=com_ 
ppvuser&view= login&retum =aHROcDovL2RlZm Vuc2VuZXdzc3RhbmQu Y29tL2NvbXB v 
bm VudC9vcHRpb24s Y29tX3B wdi9J dGVta WQsMjg4 L2lkLDIzO Dg 1 Nzgv. 
78 In the context of deals with warlords: "From the perspective of US PI [a private military 
and security companyl, making a deal with the local warlord may be the most effective (and 
cheapest) way to ensure the security of the construction company it is hired to protect." Gas-
ton, supra note 25, at 239. 
79 Dexter Filkins, Afghan Guards Suspected of Colluding with Insurgents, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 6,2010, at AI. 
80 See, e.g., RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: A HISTORY OF UNITED 
STATES MILITARY STRATEGY AND POLICY (1977). 
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arrival at the destination.81 No Americans go along with the convoy, and the 
Afghan PSCs handle their interactions without reporting to the Americans. It 
does not work to send small contingents of United States troops along with a 
convoy to watch over it, because a small group of troops face becoming a 
target themselves in the event of a Taliban ambush.82 Moreover, for ordinary 
cargoes like foodstuffs or construction material, a local commanding officer 
does not want to spare a significant level of troops from offensive initiatives 
, to supplementing PSCs. A local combat commander views the funds di-
verted to the Taliban from any particular convoy or development site, not as 
a direct threat to that commander's troops, but just a drop in the ocean of 
Afghan corruption.83 
Instead, the armed forces ("Army")84 do what they feel they can in this 
situation. The Army provides relatively strong troop contingents-able to 
protect not only a convoy, but also themselves-for certain convoys. These 
include convoys with military material, like ammunition, that the Army can-
not let the Taliban acquire without disaster. 
The Karzai regime takes steps to discredit PSC firms, such as financial 
audits and investigations85 and announcements86 of the number of their legal 
violations. These actions do not seem calibrated to address those PSCs who 
violate Afghan law, but seem an indiscriminate move by the Karzai regime 
against most or all of the PSC industry. 
At first President Karzai issued decrees to ban PSCs, an extraordinary 
shock to his ally the United States.8? As it turns out, this prepared the way 
for phasing out independent PSCS88 and unveiling in stages a plan for the 
Karzai regime to establish an Afghan Personal Protection Force (APPF).89 
The APPF incorporates some substantial part of the pre-existing PSCs, and 
the American prime contractors (such as for development) will make con-
tracts with the APPF.90 
81 This paragraph is based on the briefings of the Commission's mission to Afghanistan in 
spring 2011. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19. 
82 Such an ambush could strike at a time and place of their choosing and in a situation 
without American military tactical initiative and flexibility. 
83 See COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 19. 
84 "Army" is used as a shorthand. The other United States armed forces, especially the 
Marines, were very heavily involved as well. Additionally, the United States acted as part of 
an international coalition, especially in Afghanistan, which was a NATO operation. 
85 See Joshua Partlow & Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Security Firms Are Accused of Breaking 
Afghan Laws, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2011, at A15. 
86 See Joshua Partlow, Afghanistan Says 16 Private Security Firms Broke Laws, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 9, 2011, at A9. 
87 See generally Lucas Anderson, Kicking the National Habit: The Legal and Policy Argu-
ments for Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39 PuB. CaNT. L.1. 113 (2009). 
88 See Ray Rivera, Afghanistan Sets Timetable for Phasing Out Most Private Security 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,2011, at A9. 
89 See Lauren Groth, Transforming Accountability: A Proposal for Reconsidering How 
Human Rights Obligations Are Applied to Private Military Security Firms, 35 HASTINGS INr'L 
CaMP. L. REv. 29, 42 & nn.52-54 (2012). 
90 See Matthew Rosenberg & Graham Bowley, Afghan Anger and Security Fears Put Aid 
Groups' Plans at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,2012, at AI. 
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As the New York Times reported, development organizations "feared 
that the new [APPF] force would be poorly trained and end up as little more 
than a militia for the variety of power brokers who dominate Afghan polit-
ics-or the Taliban."91 An inspector general studied the expected costs of the 
APPF: "The auditor's analysis found that the cost of Afghan guards who 
provide security for U.S.-funded projects could increase by as much as 46 
percent."92 
In some respects, this just carries the initial mistake by the United 
States of putting PSCs in a high-risk situation to the next level. By having 
security provided by private companies, the United States allows corruption 
in its allied government, the building up of the power of rival warlords, and 
the funding of the enemy. Now, the APPF may keep the same individual 
PSCs, with higher levels of payment by prime contractors and hence higher 
levels of corruption, warlordism, and diversion to the Taliban. 
II. LIMITING HIGH RISK USES OF PSCs BECAUSE THESE ARE 
"I NHERENTL y GOVERNMENTAL" 
The category of "inherently governmental" should limit the use of 
PSCs for high-risk functions. The years of use of PSCs in Iraq and Afghani-
stan have shown the great harm that comes from allowing use of PSCs for 
high-risk functions and only limiting combat functions. Local nationals are 
seriously alienated, government funds flow through PSCs to warlords and 
the enemy, and PSCs become especially remote from accountability when 
they are subcontractors or sub-subcontractors. However, to date, the debates 
over PSCs have not led to imposing overall solutions to these problems. 
A. Improving on the Current Legal Regime for PSCs 
To deal with the particular problems of PSCs performing "high-risk" 
functions in the war zone, the current approach must change, to define "in-
herently governmental" functions as more than just those involving combat. 
Generally speaking, three particular problems have occurred in the war zone. 
First, there are risks to local nationals from mobile PSC work protecting or 
convoying, as shown in Nisour Square. Such incidents destroy the faith of 
local nationals that only the governing sovereigns-their government and its 
allied governments-may drive about their roads wielding weapons. Sec-
ond, in Afghanistan, there are risks of PSC payoffs to warlords and the en-
emy. Third, PSCs serve under prime contractors, as subcontractors or sub-
subcontractors, which render them remote from accountability. 
911d. 
92 Emesto London, Audit: Afghan Guards Will Cost More, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2012, at 
All. 
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There is little hope that strong administrative oversight will suffice to 
resolve these problems. Oversight may somewhat reduce some of these PSC 
risks. However, with the limited oversight that is feasible in the war zone, 
the risks remain high. For example, it is highly impractical to oversee PSC-
accompanied convoys in Taliban territory and to restrain them from payoff 
for passage. 
The military has a specific reason for overlooking the high-risk aspects 
of Afghan PSCs that implicate inherently governmental functions. Namely, 
the local military commanders want to keep all of their own forces for mili-
tary operations, and to farm out what duties they can to private actors like 
PSCs. The point of a definite line regarding inherently governmental func-
tions is to take away the tactical judgment from a local combat commander 
thinking primarily about local missions. The establishment of rules removes 
the temptation of using PSCs for a duty that should only be governmental. 
The current regime has a main component, namely, the domestic rules 
defining "inherently governmental" in terms of combat, built upon disap-
pointing policies promulgated from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
("OFPP"),93 and a secondary component, international law, specifically the 
Montreux Document, shaped to suit the PSC industry. 
To solve the problems of warzone PSCs, the rules should change from 
their present focus just on combat, to a broader focus on high risk situations. 
1. Office of Federal Procurement Policy Rules 
The Obama Administration started out with a White House initiative to 
strengthen the rules about PSCs as part of revisiting what in government 
contracting is inherently governmental. This was, by far, the closest the gov-
ernment has come in the last four years to addressing the inadequate regime. 
That initiative started hopefully, but did not accomplish enough in the PSC 
context. 
In spring 2009, the White House released a bold presidential statement 
on several aspects of government contracting. The presidential statement 
warned that "the line between inherently governmental activities that should 
not be outsourced and commercial activities that may be subject to private 
sector competition has been blurred" and inadequately defined.94 As a result, 
contractors may be performing inherently governmental functions. 95 The 
presidential statement commanded the federal government to ensure that 
those functions that are inherently governmental in nature are performed by 
93 See generally Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 56,227 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
94 Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_officelMemorandum-for-
the-Heads-of-Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-Subject-Government. 
95 See Work Reserved for Performance by Federal Governmental Employees, 75 Fed. Reg. 
16,188,16,188-89 (Mar. 31, 2010). 
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federal employees and are not outsourced.96 Accordingly, the presidential 
statement proposed to "clarify when governmental outsourcing for services 
is and is not appropriate. "97 
Of course, the 2009 presidential statement applies to the whole range of 
the inherently governmental issue, including many important domestic con-
texts. It does not purport to apply solely to wartime contracting. However, 
PSCs matter in the context of the President's statement. Use of PSCs re-
ceived intense criticism after Nisour Square, both in the United States and in 
Iraq. Moreover, the 2008 election brought into office a president with a new 
willingness to recognize the controversial aspects of the Iraq War, including 
the role of PSCs like Blackwater. On the Iraqi side, during the same period 
at the start of 2009, the SOFA gave control over PSCs to the Iraqis, who 
proceeded to expel Blackwater. 
This presidential statement (and the Iraqi action) seemed to usher in an 
entirely new phase of strengthening the limits on PSCs, possibly moving 
toward a new standard beyond merely keeping PSCs away from combat.98 A 
year later, in 2010, the OFPP, the White House's arm on government con-
tracting, put forth a draft rule on the subject of what is inherently govern-
mental, expressly linked to the 2009 presidential statement, notably 
including its PSC aspect.99 However, the proposed rule remained with the 
basic guide of relation to combat, not to high-risk activities. wo It did not 
announce much hope for reforms, but it did not close the door to the possi-
bility of other developments. 
In late 2011, OFPP announced its final version of the rule. WI By that 
time, years had passed with the government still using PSCs extensively in 
high-risk situations both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the 2010 
election took away majority control from those members of Congress who 
had held hearings and issued staff reports for limiting PSCS.102 
Hence, the final version of the rule mostly shows that limits on PSCs 
would receive no strengthening, even as to areas of enemy forces. As OFPP 
noted, in its list of inherently governmental examples, "[m]any of those 
961d. 
971d. 
98 This initiative generated hope, as the author personally expressed at the time in an 
interview by National Public Radio for a news segment entitled "Obama Cracks Down on 
Government Contractors." Morning Edition: Obama Cracks Down on Government Contrac-
tors, NATL PUB. RADIO (Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org!templates!story! 
story.php?storyId= 101465347. 
99 See generally Work Reserved for Performance by Federal Governmental Employees, 75 
Fed. Reg. 16,188 (Mar. 31, 2010). 
100 A subheading referred to the "use of deadly force, including combat, security opera-
tions performed in direct support of combat, and security that could evolve into combat." Id. at 
16,192. 
101 See generally Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 56,227 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
102 See generally Hearing of the House Comm. on Oversight and Gov 't Reform: Blackwa-
ter USA; Private Security Contracting in Iraq & Afghanistan, I 12th Congo (2007); WARLORD, 
INC., supra note 64. 
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[commenters] who believed the list was too narrow suggested the addition 
of functions involving private security contractors, especially when per-
formed in hostile environments."!03 The rules still retain their combat focus, 
in regard to what they expressly declare. The OFPP policy letter104 "[a]dded 
to the list of inherently governmental functions: (i) [a]ll combat and (ii) 
security operations in certain situations connected with combat or potential 
combat." 105 
Moreover, the rules accomplish even less in the way of limits than they 
seem to at first glance. It is no wonder that two commentators-lawyers in 
this field-analyzing the late 2011 DoD rules on PSCs actually titled their 
comment, alarmingly, "Contingency Contracting: Contractors Continue 
March Toward Full Combat Roles."I06 OFPP's ambiguities open the way for 
departments, both State in Iraq and the Army in Afghanistan, to press for-
ward with including inappropriate war functions for PSCs. 
First, in Iraq, the policy expresses what seems, at first, a limit that might 
keep PSCs from joining ongoing fighting. This seemed, at a minimum, to 
rule out the type of activity termed quick reaction forces. In this activity, 
when any group, which would include mobile PSCs such as convoy security, 
run into an ambush or some other sudden enemy attack, they may summon 
"quick reaction forces" as fighters to help get them away.107 Quick reaction 
forces seek to do their job without engaging with the enemy, but they may 
well get involved in trading fire with enemy ambushers, with all the risks of 
such firing, such as injury to civilians. This is a vital function, but OFPP 
may rightly reserve it to governmental fighters, because there is much more 
than a minimal chance, but rather a serious possibility, of exchanges of fire. 
However, State wants PSC quick reaction forces in Iraq.lOs State has 
still not developed any kind of diplomatic security reserve that could shore 
up State's position in Iraq. State may have to exploit what that department 
perceives as ambiguities in OFPP's rules in order to get quick reaction forces 
in Iraq.l09 State argues that such PSCs are available for already-occurring 
103 Perfonnance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
56,231. 
104 As one article summarized in 2012: "Most recently, in September 2011, the Obama 
administration issued a final policy letter on inherently governmental functions .... including 
(I) combat and (2) security operations in direct support of combat or when there is a signifi-
cant potential for combat." Groth, supra note 89, at 74. 
105 Perfonnance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
56,229. 
106 Herbert Fenster & John Sorrenti, Contractors Continue March Toward Full Combat 
Roles, 97 FED. CONT. REp. (BNA) No. 74 (Jan. 23, 2012). 
107 See generally Col. P.M. Lorez, Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were They Effective?, 
42 NAVAL L. REv. 62 (1995). 
108 See Morgan Cohen, State Department Assuming Military Duties in Post-Withdrawal 
Iraq, HARV. NAT\.. SEC. J. (Mar. 1,2012,6:23 PM), http://harvardnsj.org/2012/03/state-depart 
ment-assuming-military-duties-in-post-withdrawal-iraq ("State Department contractors in Iraq 
could be ... retrieving casualties if there are violent incidents .... ") (citation omitted). 
109 See Status Report on the Transition to a Civilian-Led Mission in Iraq: Hearing Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec., Homeland Sec. and Foreign Ops., H. Comm on Oversight and 
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fighting, but only when that fighting is defensive, rather than military, in its 
mission. lIo Since the convoy PSCs did not have a military mission, quick 
reaction forces helping them did not have a military mission, either. llI 
In this view, the quick reaction PSCs merely assist the defensive effort 
in the State Department's other non-military missions.ll2 State may have to 
highlight that the goal of protecting and extracting (from hostile fire) for 
quick reaction forces contrasted with an Army unit's military missions of 
engaging enemy forces for the goal of inflicting casualties or strategic losses 
on them. This may narrowly construe the limit on PSCs in "combat" by 
emphasizing the difference between military and diplomatic mission goals, 
rather than how the PSCs get involved where risks are high. 
The issue is not whether the quick reaction function warrants perform-
ance by someone on the United States side. Rather, the issue is whether State 
may contend that the function could be private rather than being inherently 
governmental. ll3 The OFPP policy letter seems to answer "no," but since it 
does not flat-out condemn high risks, it leaves ways that State may reinvent 
it as a "yes." 
A second, less immediately apparent aspect lets State free itself from 
serious constraint by the 2011 OFPP rules. The rules cite examples of what 
might come too close to combat, but these did not, at least with explicitness, 
constrain State's planned large PSC force in Iraq. The OFPP's cited examples 
tout that guards-around consulates, perhaps, as distinct from mobile con-
Gov't Reform, ll2th Congo 3 (2011) (statement of Patrick Kennedy, Under Sec'y for Mgmt., 
U.S. Dep't of State) [hereinafter State Testimony). 
110 The press has repeated the questions asked about such issues. What happens if "a 
supply convoy comes under fire" and "[w]ho determines whether contract guards engage the 
assailants and whether a quick-reaction force is sent to assist them?" Luiza Savage, The 
Trouble with Security, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 8, 2010, at 41 (quotations omitted). 
III PSCs "will be focused, primarily, exclusively, on the protection of our diplomatic per-
sonnel. They are not going to be involved in any operations beyond that." White House Confi-
dent State Department Can Manage Enormous Private Security Contractor Force in Iraq, 
NEWSTEX WEB BLOGS (Oct. 22, 2011, 3:13 PM), http://news.firedoglake.comJ20111l0/211 
white-house-confident-state-department-can-manage-enormous-private-security-contractor-
force-in-iraq (quoting Ben Rhodes, White House deputy national security adviser for strategic 
communications). 
112 The discussion of the kind of arguments that State may convey comes mostly from 
informal exchanges at briefings by State to the Commission on Wartime Contracting. One 
formal expression of State's approach came in a report by the Government Accountability 
Office ("GAO"). The Commission had a recommendation to "phase out the use of host-nation 
private security contractors in Afghanistan for the convoys on high-volume roads that the 
insurgency controls or contests." U.S. Gov'r ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-854R, CON-
TINGENCY CONTRACTING: AGENCY AcnONS TO ADDRESS RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMIS-
SION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 10 (2012). State's rejoinder: 
"State officials stated that this recommendation is not applicable because they interpreted it 
being directed towards DOD." Id. State similarly ducked a recommendation about assessing 
the risk of static-security sites. Id. at 11. As for a recommendation explicitly directed at "the 
ambassador" in a country about formally making "determinations of security-contracting ap-
propriateness," State just bluntly said: "State officials stated the department does not plan to 
implement this recommendation." Id. 
113 State plans to "increase our Quick Reaction Force capabilities." State Testimony, supra 
note 109, at 13. 
228 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 50 
voys or mobile PSDs-may be PSCs. That seems an entirely appropriate 
example. Moreover, it connects up the situation in peacetime, in which the 
need for PSCs predominantly consist of such guarding-an era comforting 
for the absence of new interpretive issues such as "quick reaction forces." 
Yet State may apply an approach to make use of the examples put forth 
in order to expand the role for PSCs. The examples range from those linked 
to combat, at one end of the spectrum, and static guarding of facilities, at the 
other end of the spectrum. OFPP does not touch on examples in the middle 
that were high risk but unrelated to combat, like supporting supply convoys 
going through areas of enemy strength and activity, in a country in which 
this may mean payoffs by PSCs to the enemy. Therefore, State may make 
arguments to stretch analogies between all the PSC activities it wants and 
merely guarding facilities. 114 
For example, in Iraq, State may need to use counter-battery radar when 
insurgents fire rockets or mortars at a State embassy or consulate or other 
facility, to locate the source of the insurgent fire and possibly to direct strik-
ing back (either by its own or by Iraqi ArmytlS weapons).116 Explicit OFPP 
rules with more examples might consider saying that directing firing with 
weaponry beyond small arms l17 is inherently governmental. The task cer-
tainly needs doing, but the direction of firing back should come from the 
government itself, not PSCs. 
However, State may push the envelope by contending that the counter-
battery radar function has many resemblances to static guarding. Counter-
battery radar was static, too, as well as defensive, protective, and, supportive 
of State's (diplomatic) missions rather than the Army's (military) missions. 
No one should underestimate the willingness of State to look for loop-
holes in the OFPP rule in order to say that outlying high-risk functions for 
PSCs in Iraq are not inherently governmental. II8 OFPP states the illustration 
114 State asserts it is closely coordinated with the OFPP rules. "State personnel were ac-
tively engaged with the Office of Federal Procurement Policy in preparing its new policy let-
ter." State Testimony, supra note 109, at 6. 
115 State seems to separate counter-battery radar, which it acquires just for warning of 
incoming fire, and counter-battery fire, which is to fire back, professing it does not intend to 
have its own counter-battery firing. One possibility is that State may acquire the counter-
battery radar, and only go to counter-battery fire if the Iraqi Army does not provide such fire. 
However, the Iraqi Army does not appear ready to take on that task. ANTHONY CORDESMAN ET 
AL., THE REAL OUTCOME OF THE IRAQ WAR: U.S. AND IRANIAN STRATEGIC COMPETmON IN 
IRAQ 57 (2011) ("The IA [Iraqi Army] has very little in the way of artillery, and what it does 
possess is mostly light and outdated. The IA has virtually no counter-battery capabilities."). 
116 "Other U.S. military infrastructure could also remain in Iraq. The State Department is 
negotiating with the Pentagon to have its security contractors assume control of a rocket-
detection system that protects the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, military officials said." Aaron C. 
Davis, U.S. Plans for Presence in Iraq After Pullout, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2011, at A8. 
117 See generally State Testimony, supra note 109, at 16 (alluding to how State's PSC 
"Kabul and Baghdad guard forces also have specialized weapons and equipment"). 
118 State equates its "task orders for static and movement security" as though there were 
not enormous differences between static guarding and convoy security in areas of enemy 
strength and activity. State Testimony, supra note 109, at 6. 
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of a barred function: "Security that entails augmenting or reinforcing others 
(whether private security contractors, civilians, or military units) that have 
become engaged in combat.""9 
State may push for a focus on "combat." The department may see 
"combat" as only military missions for military purposes. A State convoy 
with material for State's consulates or training centers that goes through an 
area of potential enemy strength and activity and comes under enemy fire, or 
a quick reaction force that joins it, does not engage in "combat"-it does 
not have a military mission for a military purpose. 
In any of these situations, moreover, a critic of State has no neutral 
arbiter to whom an appeal might exist to rein in State. OFPP does not per-
form that role. Therefore, State just needs a rationalization, however thin, to 
take high risks, when it responds to inquiries by, for example, Congress. 
2. Montreux Document 
Another key legal instrument about PSCs consists of an international 
agreement, the Montreux Document. '2o After Nisour Square, seventeen na-
tions, including the United States, negotiated Montreux. This was not a rule 
cracking down on the PSC industry-it was written with the fullest industry 
participation. 121 The result is an agreement which urges nations to follow 
"best practices."122 It legitimatizes the higher-quality PSC firms, helping 
them get and keep business in the war zone and elsewhere. Montreux is 
important in the putative "framework" of international law for PSCs. Its 
best practices, like the palliative reforms of State and DoD after Nisour 
Square, help PSCs to get work at the outer limits of what current legal re-
strictions let them do. '23 
However, Montreux does not take on the task, even to the limited ex-
tent done by the late 2011 OFPP policy letter, of sorting out or explaining 
how to draw a limit for PSCs in the war zone. It does not help find the line 
between the polar examples of PSCs taking part in military operations with 
combat units-something which no one considers proper for PSCs-and 
static guarding in relatively safe areas, which all consider proper for PSCs. 
Whatever attention Montreux may get in some realms, namely, the self-justi-
119 Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,227, 
56,240 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
120 U.N. General Assembly, Letter Dated Oct. 2, 2008 From the Permanent Representative 
of Switzerland addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. AJ63/467 (Oct. 6, 2008) 
[hereinafter Montreux Document], available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ 
icrc_002_0996.pdf. 
121 The industry association is the International Stability Operations Association 
("ISOA"). 
122 James Cockayne, Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, 
Negotiation, Weaknesses and Promise of the Montrewc Document, 13 1. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 
401, 403 (2009). 
123 See generally Stephanie M. Hurst, "Trade in Force": The Needfor Effective Regulation 
of Private Military and Security Companies, 84 S. CAL. L. REv. 447 (2011). 
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fication by the high-quality end of the PSC industry, it has not become a 
cynosure of United States government limits on PSC functions. 124 
The PSC industry took a large role in Montreux seemingly as a priority 
to legitimate all of its functions, and perhaps secondarily for the higher-
status components of the industry to bar the lower-status ones from winning 
lucrative work. After the fact, a pro-industry commentator showed how in-
dustry would like to use Montreux: to assert that anything PSCs might do in 
Iraq and Afghanistan could never pose a challenge to rules about inherently 
governmental functions. Industry cites this paragraph of Montreux: 
Paragraph 9 states: 
(a) 'PMSCs' are private business entities that provide military and! 
or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. 
Military and security services include, in particular, armed guard-
ing and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, build-
ings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons 
systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local 
forces and security personnel. 
This paragraph seems to be just a standardized international definition 
to show what is being discussed under the rubric of the term PMSCs (or 
PSCs). It does not seem drafted to separate what is or is not inherently 
governmental. 125 
However, the PSC industry could try to stretch much further this use of 
the simple definition of "PMSC" as not subject to override by self-labeling. 
Their argument loosely says that the line for that definition is the line for 
inherently governmental. More specifically, they note that the Montreux cat-
egory (at another provision in the Montreux document), of "attribution" as 
inherently governmental, is a categorization that focuses on "formal author-
ity."126 In this view, as long as PSCs do not have formal authority, and as 
long as they engage in what the definition says of "armed guarding and 
protection of persons and objects, such as convoys,"127 they would not per-
form inherently governmental functions. 
124 In all of the meetings or briefings of the Commission on Wartime Contracting with 
DoD and State officials, high and low, attended by the author, Montreux hardly got mentioned, 
apart from extremely narrow considerations of policy in Washington regarding the implemen-
tation of Montreux in regards to third-party certification of PSCs. 
125 Rather, it seems drafted primarily just so that the self-labeling of groups does not de-
fine them. For example, guns for hire that serve as front-line combat units for third-world 
leaders could not come under the definition of proper PMSCs even if they self-labeled them-
selves "Blackwater Protective, Defensive and Advisory Services." 
126 This is similar to the difference in the context of domestic prisons between a parole 
board which has authority to let a prisoner out and a prison guard who does not have anything 
like that kind of authority. The parole board with that authority may perform an inherently 
governmental function while the prison guard without that authority does not. 
127 Montreux Document, supra note 120, at 6. 
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PSC spokespersons may try to use in the same way a comment in the 
OFPP policy of September 12, 2011. OFPP said: 
government performance may be the only way that Federal offi-
cials can retain control of their inherently governmental responsi-
bilities. For example, providing security in a volatile, high-risk 
environment may be inherently governmental if the responsible 
Federal official cannot anticipate the circumstances and challenges 
that may arise, and cannot specify the range of acceptable 
conduct. 128 
Using this limited example of what may be considered inherently gov-
ernmental PSC firms would propose to draw a very broad swath as to what 
is not inherently governmental. Seemingly, the PSC industry may contend 
there is nothing wrong with using PSCs even "in a volatile high-risk envi-
ronment" -they just need government planning in advance, and rules of 
engagement. 129 
The PSC industry does not need to use this in a loudly proclaimed ef-
fort to legitimate that PSCs can perform high-risk functions. They merely 
need to lay the groundwork for some day when the annual defense authori-
zation law touches on PSCs for some other, non-crucial reason, and ease in a 
confirmation of the industry view of OFPP and Montreux. The industry may 
very well get support on this from DoD and State. After that, the law and 
policy of the United States will not only have failed to expressly establish 
the right lessons of the past decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also 
the United States will have confirmed a very wrong lesson from the over-
reliance on PSCs during these long wars. 
However, the relevant aspect, for OFPP policy and Montreux for "attri-
bution" as inherently governmental, in the PSC context has to do with the 
context of the government's "monopoly of violence," not the government's 
monopoly of authority over liberty as in prison parole. There is a very sepa-
rate issue, as a concern of the inherently governmental boundary, about the 
"authority" of private prison managers over the liberty of inmates, 130 urue-
lated to the concerns about PSCs on the battlefield. Authority over the liberty 
of inmates might be the key factor for whether parole decisions are inher-
ently governmental, but it is not a helpful factor in analyzing PSCs. 
128 Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,227, 
56,238 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
129 In other words, all the high-risk situations from Nisour Square, to Afghan convoys in 
areas of Taliban strength, belong in this industry view as functions of PSCs and that the gov-
ernment just needs to do planning and guidance. What starts out in the OFPP 20 II policy, in a 
ponderous way to rule out some PSC functions as patently inherently governmental, ends up in 
the industry's view as ruling in most other high-risk situations as not "inherently 
governmental. .. 
130 Lucas Anderson, Kicking the National Habit: The Legal and Policy Arguments for 
Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39 PUB. CONT. LJ. 113 (2009). 
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Rather, for PSCs, the issue of what is inherently governmental deals 
with the making of exceptions, and especially in a war zone, in the issue of 
sending sometimes PSCs with powerful arms into high-risk situations and/or 
into dealings with the enemy. These high-risk situations may make local 
civilians fearful of the potential use of that powerful armament. Or, the situ-
ations may routinely put PSCs where the enemy may hinder (perhaps even 
destroy) their convoys, and where they have their substantial American 
funds for payoffs to the enemy. 
If the Army hired PSC groups to go along on Army missions as a re-
serve in case of big trouble, those PSCs would not need to have the authority 
over liberty the way a parole board does. Rather, PSC reserve units would be 
there to take part in combat. So even with advanced planning and rules of 
engagement, PSCs cannot go with Army missions as their reserve. Hence, 
by any definition, such reserve units would perform an inherently govern-
mental function, regardless of their not having authority over liberty. When 
PSCs take part in this type of violence, they demonstrate the reason war, and 
its high-risk situations, is the business of government, and not a place where 
a business (the PSC business) can wholly replace government. 131 
B. Defining, in Tenns of "High Risk," Not "Combat," the Scope of 
"Inherently Governmental" 
The United States must draw a line regarding "inherently governmen-
tal" based on high risk rather than combat. The government must draw the 
line by keeping front and center that palliative reforms, although welcome, 
cannot obviate the need for limits on which functions are inherently 
governmental. 
Leaving whether to draw a line to State's preferences in Iraq led to 
planning for virtually a mobile PSC army in Iraq's capital.132 In future inter-
ventions, the United States might find its armed, omnipresent PSC use alien-
ates the local nationals, who see it as stripping them of sovereign self-
government. 133 Leaving this to the Army's outsourcing in places of tribal 
loyalty, like Afghanistan or Somalia, may lead to the continuation of a flow 
of American funds to the enemy.134 
131 Nor should PSCs perfonn the protective or defensive functions of quick reaction forces 
and counter-battery radar. This, too, is government's business, not the role of business in the 
place of government. If industry would dispute this, imagine if Army units in the Afghanistan 
war brought along PSC groups to be passive until needed to protect their flanks. Posit that the 
PSCs did not perform the central military mission of pushing forward toward and against the 
enemy but merely performed the passive, "protective and defensive" function of readiness to 
return fire if the enemy attacks the Army unit's flanks. 
132 See Aaron Davis, Contours of Lasting American Presence in Iraq Take Shape. CAN-
BERRA TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011, at A22. 
133 Schmidt & Schmitt, supra note 57, at AI. 
134 Riechmann & Lardner. supra note 72. at 2. 
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Line-drawing based on different aspects of high risk-in addition just 
to combat alone-should speak to the diverse functions of PSCs that may 
present a high risk. The first aspect consists of the potential for seriously 
alienating local nationals by casualties, fear-inspiring high-visibility pres-
ence unleashed from stationary facilities guarding, or otherwise. Only in the 
contemporary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has the new extensive use of 
PSCs for mobile functions in areas of enemy strength and activity brought 
the lesson home of the high risk from the widespread and intense fear and 
distrust of the local nationals and their government about PSCs. 
Apart from the impact of the civilian casualties themselves, other mat-
ters multiply this. The United States has never used PSCs on this scale 
before. In these countries, the gratitude among the population for the United 
States throwing out their old regimes-the Ba'ath Party and the Taliban-
will not last throughout the population in the long term. Local tribal groups 
may see PSCs as a private armed force intruding on their territory. PSCs 
serve as a lightning rod for other local discontent and a convenient whipping 
boy for antagonistic leaders.135 Today's phone cameras, Internet, and social 
media propagate vivid images of civilian casualties at an unheard of speed. 
Well before the population wants the American military presence to depart, 
it will want the PSC presence gone. 
The war against an insurgency consists in part of a contest for the hearts 
and mind of the population. The vigor of the Iraqi government efforts to 
reduce the PSC presence during the negotiation of the SOFA and its subse-
quent expulsion of Blackwater and pressuring of the remaining PSCs be-
speaks the population's reactions. Insurgencies in the two wars present a 
greater problem for the use of PSCs. The mixing of the insurgents and the 
popUlation means that incidents and casualties from PSCs may occur any-
where, including, dramatically, at the heart of the capital. The population 
feels itself without protection from PSCs anywhere, by either their own gov-
ernment or the United States government. They feel at the mercy of intimi-
dating for-profit private firms without military discipline and sovereign 
accountability. 
Second, agencies should not weigh high-risk use of PSCs as a balance 
of pros and cons.136 There are absolute limits, not just balancing tests. For 
example, even if the Army showed that its efforts required more armed war-
riors than its own units had, it could not hire PSCs to provide flank protec-
tion or reserves for its units moving forward against the enemy. There is a 
taboo. Inherently governmental lines require line-drawing, not balancing by 
agencies. The public in an insurgent country must view its own government 
as a partner with the United States, not just a helpless entity which gives 
.35 Davis, supra note 132, at A22 (antagonism by prominent Iraqi figure, Moqtada al-
Sadr, to State Department planning for presence supported by private security). 
136 The author respects both the sacrifices of PSCs and their properly proud stance that 
their PSDs have never lost a client. Their accomplishments are impressive. 
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over control of territory to what local nationals may see as roving armed 
foreigners or local fighters without fixed loyalties. Furthermore, the Taliban 
must know that the kind of armed personnel who move convoys in areas of 
enemy strength and activity are not open, like some Afghan PSCs, to bar-
gaining for mutual profit. 137 Therefore, the United States must apply the cri-
terion of inherently governmental as a matter of its own sovereignty. 
Additionally, State and DoD have shown that they will strike any bal-
ance left to their discretion in favor of hiring PSCs, even for high-risk func-
tions. This is not from ignoble motives. There is no reason to think the State 
and DoD officials have any disloyalty to their job in their agency in hiring 
PSCs. The State and DoD officials in the field are dedicated and profes-
sional, giving years of their lives to a grueling and dangerous struggle. 
Rather, DoD wants to save its troops for military missions and State wants to 
save its personnel for diplomatic missions. Naturally, to them, the agency 
mission comes first, if any balancing occurs. Both State and DoD can more 
easily obtain from Congress the money needed for PSCs than the authority 
to hire additional personnel to insource that security work or to create re-
serve personnel units for the years to come. The agency and Congress both 
see adding personnel, as contrasted with merely buying PSC help, as an 
unwelcome expansion of the government. Because of this, the high risks 
with hiring PSCs seem acceptable to the agencies. 
Particularly with respect to local national PSCs in convoys without 
American personnel, as is standard in Afghanistan, the United States has 
little visibility and little oversight as to what the PSCs do when their con-
voys travel through areas without a large United States presence. The United 
States cannot police the dealings of Afghan PSCs with other armed Af-
ghans. 138 Yet, to have PSCs without local national Afghans would amount to 
a cure worse than the disease. Afghans know they are good fighters l39 and 
civilian Afghans trust, relatively, other Afghans (at least those with similar 
backgrounds, i.e., compatible Pashtuns or Tajiks) more than they would trust 
third country national PSCs. Even as it is, Afghans resent how little of 
American contracting dollars trickle down to them. Bringing non-Afghans 
into the country to take away PSC jobs from Afghans would alienate them 
further. 
PSC spokesmen might argue that the government does have oversight 
mechanisms, including the "Serious Incident Reports" or SIRs. 140 These are 
137 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, at 34. 
138 "In contrast to Iraq where 8% of armed security contractors are local nationals, in 
Afghanistan, 95% are local nationals." MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., THE DE-
PARTMENT OF DEFENSE's USE OF PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANI-
STAN: BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS, AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 6 (2009). 
139 The wry comment about Afghan hires for their own army or for PSCs is, give them a 
first-class new rifle, they can't hit the target, but let them bring along the old one, with the off-
center scope, that they have used all their life-and then, they will. 
140 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, PRIvATE SECURITY CONTRACTOR AT WAR: ENDING THE 
CULTURE OF IMpUNITY 9-10 (2008). 
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self-reporting about incidents-reports that the PSCs should fill out when 
they get in a firefight or even discharge a weapon and engage in shooting.141 
The government touts SIRs as showing it had taken control of the PSC prob-
lem after Nisour Square. 142 However, virtually none of the various studies of 
SIRs find PSCs ever saying they caused a civilian casualty, regardless of 
how violent various particular fracases might be. 143 
Rather, the SIRs tell a one-sided tale of PSCs (properly) resisting dan-
gerous enemy attacks without ever having any such civilian injuries,l44 not 
even anonymous civilians that the PSCs might unavoidably injure during 
entirely proper efforts to get who, or what, they were protecting out of an 
ambush. This type of incident report may well have accuracy for some types 
of PSCs, but taken as a profession of universal PSC perfection, the SIRs just 
reflect how little incentive PSCs have to report civilian casualties. Of course, 
PSCs will turn in more credible SIRs when Americans from the Army or the 
Diplomatic Security Bureau 145 accompany the PSCs, as became the case for 
State PSDs after Nisour Square. But that arrangement does not appear feasi-
ble to do with convoys because the enemy might turn out in strength, and 
overwhelm the PSCs mainly to kill the Americans. 
More broadly, apart from the nitty-gritty of these particular examples, 
they should suggest what may feed into a high-risk function being inherently 
governmental rather than suitable for PSCs. It matters whether to expect 
local civilians (say, Afghans) not only to escape from becoming potential 
casualties, but also to have good channels to complain when they or their 
families do become casualties. 
In an incident involving PSCs accompanying convoys, an injured fam-
ily probably does not know from which base or camp or similar facility the 
PSCs came. PSCs just may roar through town and exchange fire. The pres-
ence in that town of the PSCs may have occurred so momentarily and unex-
pectedly that the family of the casualties can give very little description of 
the PSCs. When the family of the casualty tries to obtain official redress, 
they have the classic lack of clues as in a domestic hit-and-run driver acci-
141 There are certainly Iraq PSC weapon firings in large numbers in the SIRs, but reports 
of Iraqi civilian casualties from such shootings are few and far between. Richard Hall, Security 
Firms Involved in 200 Shootings in Iraq, THE mDEP., Dec. 14,2011, at 32, available at http:// 
www.independent.co.uklnews/worldimiddle-eastlsecurity-firms-involved-in-200-shootings-in-
iraq-6276688.html. 
142 William Pincus, Fatal Shootings by Iraq Contractors Drop in 2008, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
20,2008, at A9. 
143 Are Private Security Contractors Performing Inherently Governmental Functions?: 
Hearing Before the Comm 'n on Wartime Contracting, 11lth Congo (2010) (no witnesses con-
tradicted this). 
144 Id. 
145 For a description of the Bureau, see Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. DEP'r OF 
STATE, http://www.state.gov/m/ds/index.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
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dent. Furthermore, PSCs as sub- or sub-subcontractors are remote from gov-
ernment accountability. 146 
Moreover, the cloak of uncertainty increases when the convoy went 
through an area of enemy strength because of tension inhibiting trust and 
communication. Tension may exist between the civilians and the typically 
corrupt police, or between the civilians and the nearest United States forces. 
The occurrence of a firefight with injuries or deaths only increases the ten-
sion. The Fallujah incident of 2004 shows the extremes of anger on both 
sides. 147 There is a general problem of privatizing functions where the indi-
viduals on the "receiving" end, like prisoners, schoolchildren, inmates at 
mental institutions, and so on do not have the usual channels of complaint 
that exist in the general population. How much worse that problem becomes 
in a place where the United States wages war on an armed insurgency. 
These concrete examples open up another line of inquiry: the contrast 
between static guards of installations in safe areas, on the one hand, and 
mobile PSD or convoy PSCs operating in areas of enemy strength on the 
other. Proponents of PSCs may tout, as their model, static guards in safe 
areas. Such PSC proponents maintain that as long as some other function 
shares characteristics of such static guards-say, that a personal security de-
tail in Baghdad is far away from combat, and such a PSC has a protective 
and defensive function-the PSCs are not inherently governmental. How-
ever, mobile PSDs or convoy PSCs may have a serious dose, regardless of 
their defensive or protective functions, of the high-risk aspects just dis-
cussed. This lays bare the fallacy of State's generalizing the static guard 
functions to justify what it planned for its mini-army in post-drawdown 
Iraq.148 Some of State's PSCs simply have too much risk not to be inherently 
governmental. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were the first long wars for the 
United States since the Vietnam War over forty years ago. Necessarily, with 
all the changes in four decades, the United States took many experimental 
leaps in how to conduct war with an insurgency. Strikingly, the United 
States used PSCs on a massive scale never seen before. PSCs operated at the 
very limits of the boundary area between what they can be allowed to do and 
what is inherently governmental and beyond what they should do. 
This Article has laid out the choice between the existing policy, of de-
ciding what is inherently governmental only by a relation with combat, and a 
146 See generally Pincus, supra note 15; U.S. Sues Kellogg, supra note 32 (government 
suing KBR relating to bills from its sub-subcontractors). 
147 See GRAHAM, supra note 39, at 459. See generally JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: 
THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY (2007). 
148 See Richard Lardner, State Wants to Form Mini-Army for Iraq Security, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (June 14, 2010), http://www.deseretnews.com/articleI700040170. 
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more robust criterion keeping PSCs out of other high-risk activity. These 
distinctions matter greatly for post-drawdown Iraq, and, also, for Afghani-
stan during its own drawdown and afterwards. 
Unfortunately, if inevitably, these distinctions matter for another rea-
son: the wars to come. The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan will be with us 
as long as the lessons of Vietnam, notwithstanding the intense debate over 
just what those lessons are. The United States Army may someday become 
irresistibly drawn into Yemen, Somalia,149 Pakistan,150 Syria, Mexico, or an-
other place where perils lurk for the United States' security. Then and there, 
the United States may use PSCs. Yet, high risks will occur in future wars, 
too. A story about the supply convoys in Pakistan headed for Afghanistan 
epitomizes this prospect: "Tribal-area militants will profit, too. They demand 
protection money from the companies that haul the freight." 151 It seems the 
problems of PSCs paying the enemy will happen outside Afghanistan, con-
ceivably again and again. 
The United States will lose out if the PSC industry, and the bureaucratic 
interests of State and DoD, effectively codify the wrong lessons about the 
last decade of those long wars. Hopefully, Congress will draw the right les-
son. In long future wars, the United States can entrust PSCs with certain 
limited tasks, but, after that, must do its own war work. 
149 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia Is Likely to Cut Ties to Mercenaries, Official Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at A6; Chris Tomlinson, U.S. Hires Military Contractor to Back 
Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2007), http;//www.washingtonpost. 
corn!wp-dyn!contentlarticle/2007 /03/07 / AR200703070 1304_pf.html. 
150 Karen DeYoung, CIA Suspends Drone Launches from Southwest Pakistani Base, 
WASH. POST, July 2, 2011, at AI2 ("The number of CIA personnel, along with contractors 
from the private security company then known as Blackwater, grew as the Obama administra-
tion rapidly increased the number of drone strikes."). 
151 Richard Leiby, Many Stand to Gain If Pakistan Reopens NATO Supply Lines, WASH. 
POST, May 16,2012, at A12. 
